
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URBAN CHANGE IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL WORLD

The Quality of Life in an Urban World

Peter Hall

Urban Growth and the Quality of Urban Life: A Commentary with Canadian Examples

Larry S. Bourne

Cette publication est aussi disponible en français.

Canada

CENTRE FOR FUTURE STUDIES IN HOUSING AND LIVING ENVIRONMENTS

The Centre for Future Studies was established in 1989 as the focal point of futures-oriented research within CMHC. The Centre focuses on anticipating and exploring factors and trends that will affect housing and its environment over the next decade. By raising awareness of these issues, the Centre for Future Studies contributes to the development of policy at the international, national, provincial and local levels.

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PREFACE

In the period of the Industrial Revolution all western nations underwent a transformation from an essentially rural, agrarian and resource based settlement pattern to one which is now characterized as urbanized. Cities evolved dynamically, influenced by a range of forces - initially the compelling agglomeration tendencies of industrialization and later by the incredible power of the automobile, which without a doubt has been the major factor creating the urban form of North America in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Now, in the final decade of the century, the concept of a post-industrial society, characterized by a labour force predominantly involved in service and information sectors, is readily acknowledged, even if not fully understood. Some commentators on the current transformation to this so called post-industrial society liken this period to the Industrial Revolution. If indeed this is the case, hindsight foretells that our settlement pattern, together with a broad variety of other characteristics of western society, may be exposed to a significant impact.

It is within this broad context that the Centre for Future Studies in Housing and Living Environments invited Peter Hall to set out his views, based on over thirty years of research and observation of urban systems in Europe and North America. Professor Hall responded to this challenge in preparing a far ranging analysis of what he sees as the principal trends and factors influencing urban settlements. Peter Hall identified six major structural shifts which he feels are impacting urban form, as well as the liveability, or quality of life, of urban places. His paper details these six trends and draws upon an extensive background to provide examples in support of his points.

The contribution of Hall's paper, is in drawing together the range of trends and issues currently prevailing at a global, or certainly multinational level. However, as so astutely observed in the second paper, urban trends can manifest themselves at different times and with different consequences. In reviewing Hall's paper and pondering the examples provided, one wonders just how relevant some of these trends are to Canada - a country once described as having too little history and too much geography. The Canadian urban system is far different than the European urban system and also in many respects dissimilar from the U.S.

In this context we invited an equally prominent Canadian Geographer, Larry Bourne to undertake an elaboration and extension of Peter Hall's paper and to assess the six key structural shifts as to their impact on the Canadian urban system. In preparing this commentary, Bourne has thoughtfully repackaged Hall's six trends into two predominant major trends, and prefers to discuss the remaining four trends as the social and spatial consequences of these two trends.

Together these two papers provide a stimulating assessment of the forces which will influence the continued evolution of cities - or perhaps more appropriately, settlement patterns. Indeed, the major direction appears to be one where population distribution will be characterized by a pattern of physically discontinuous but functionally linked settlements, largely outside yet near those urban centres at the upper limits of the national urban hierarchy. At the same time ,concept of a national urban hierarchy or system is being undermined by the globalization of urban systems.

The technology of the late twentieth century, related largely to information and communications, is process rather than product oriented. Whether this in itself creates a decentralizing tendency among firms and people is debatable. Less debatable, however, is the fact that this neutralizes the centralizing tendencies which created cities at the end of the last century. Thus other factors become more important. Perhaps foremost among the new emerging factors is quality of life. It is apparent that the nature and distribution of work now provides the labour force with a greater level of discretion in where the household unit chooses to locate. It is now debatable whether people follow jobs or the converse - perhaps increasingly more the latter.

The diversity and complexity of household types means that quality of life as a locational determinant of households cannot be represented in a simple equation - it is in fact a complex, or as Peter Hall describes it, an enigmatic concept, but one which nonetheless demands analysis.

The value of the Hall and Bourne contributions is in clearly articulating the new forces which demand a greater level of comprehension if we are to plan and manage growth in a more sustainable manner.

Centre for Future Studies

In Housing and Living Environments

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Larry Bourne is a professor at the University of Toronto where he is associated with both the Department of Geography and the Centre for Urban and Community Studies. Dr. Bourne is also Chair of the International Geographical Union's Commission on Urban Systems and Urban Development. Professor Bourne's publications include a periodical post census analysis of urban trends, (most recently Urban Growth Trends in Canada 1981-86 (1989)); Recycling Urban Systems and Metropolitan Areas (1990); and, with Bannon and Sinclair, Urbanization and Urban Development: Recent Trends in an Urban Context (1991).

THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AN URBAN WORLD

Peter Hall

In this paper, I first distinguish six major structural shifts that have been profoundly shaping the way people live and work in the great metropolitan areas of North America and Europe. They are:

1. The decline of the primary nuclear family, and its replacement by a variety of different living arrangements;

2. The shift from the goods-handling to the information-handling economy and society

3. The emergence of an urban underclass, isolated from the mainstream economy and mainstream society, and apparently without prospects in it;

4. The deconcentration of people and jobs from cities to suburbs and exurbs, and their reconcentration in smaller and lower-order metropolitan areas;

5. The formation of belts of urban growth, creating the potential threat of a linear megalopolis;

6. The emerging competition between cities, older versus newer, larger versus smaller.

I shall try to show that these trends are now very general in the advanced, highly urbanized regions of the world. Then, in a second section, I shall also try to show that each has consequences for the discussion of that elusive term, the quality of urban life.

SIX MAJOR TRENDS

1. The decline of the nuclear family

It is a commonplace assertion that, within the short space of about thirty years, there has been a virtual revolution in the patterns of living. Whereas the typical pattern in the 1950s was that of the primary nuclear family - a married couple with one or more children - today that is only one of a variety of living arrangements. The average household size in virtually all advanced countries has fallen to 3.0 or less. Typically, only about one-third of households now correspond to the norm of a couple (which may or may not be married) with children; between one quarter and one third are married or cohabiting couples without children; about a quarter are one-person households, of whom a majority tend to be old people; the rest comprise a variety of arrangements, including single parents and their children.

The reasons for these shifts are fairly well known: the most important include the ageing of the populations of most advanced countries, the sharp decline in age-specific birth rates, the rising divorce rates and the general tolerance of gay and lesbian lifestyles. Less clear is the impact on housing demand. It might be assumed that the main impact would be a declining demand for conventional family housing and an increased demand for smaller dwellings, especially apartments. However, this trend is by no means evident in most countries. First, single-parent households with children

exhibit a strong demand for conventional family housing. Second, older married couples whose children have grown up and left, and even widowed persons, exhibit a strong tendency to remain in conventional housing so long as they can support themselves. It appears that wherever single-family housing has established itself as the norm - that is, in England and Wales, North America, and Australasia - there is a tendency for that norm to be accepted by virtually everyone. Conventional single-family housing is seen to possess certain connotations of security, privacy, and prestige, which extend very widely throughout the population.

The implications for urban growth are significant. The most important is that the fissioning of the population into many small households is likely to be accompanied by demands for more housing, and therefore for more housing land. This in turn means that the pressure of housing costs in the most accessible and/or prestigious urban locations is likely to remain quite acute, forcing many in the population to look for housing elsewhere. The consequences will be spelled out below. Before that, however, it is necessary to consider another factor which in effect works independently.

2. The shift to the informational economy

The second trend can variously be termed the process of deindustrialization, or the tertiarization of the economy, or the shift to the information economy. Colin Clark's half-century-old argument - that there is a very long-term trend in all advanced industrial economies for the proportion of workers in manufacturing occupations and industries to fall, and for that in service industries and occupations to rise - has continued to prove true (Clark 1940): since the 1960s the tendency has been universal, and typically in advanced economies between 65 and 75 per cent of all employment does not involve the handling of goods at all. Manuel Castells suggests that we are in the middle of the second great economic transformation of modern times: from the industrial to the informational mode of production, in which the fundamental inputs are no longer material, but knowledge-based (Castells 1989). There has been particularly rapid growth in the producer and social (nonprofit) service sectors: they have exhibited rapid gains in employment while traditional sectors (non-high-tech manufacturing; distributive services) have been contracting.

There has been a corresponding change in the character of work: the typical worker today is no longer a male blue-collar factory operative but a white-collar office worker, who is just as likely to be female as male. It is important to notice, though, that the dominant office-informational sector contains a very wide range of jobs: as well as a professional-managerial elite it contains a kind of informational proletariat, working at routine information-processing functions in a factory-like environment.

The significance of this shift for the future of cities is that the growing activities have a new locational logic. We can illustrate it by two examples: one drawn from the residual production sector, and forming a bridge with the informational sector; the other from the informational sector proper.

The Informational Manufacturing Sector

The complex of activities devoted to the manufacture of communication and computing equipment has a rather clear pattern of location worldwide. First, it is highly concentrated in a few zones in each country. Some of these are relatively new, but some are in old-established industrial areas with long traditions of science-based industry (e.g. London, Boston).

In either event, such areas have a well-developed business infrastructure, both physically (major airports, motorways) and organizationally (headquarters offices, business services, educational services). Second, within these zones, there has been a pronounced pattern of outward diffusion to the urban periphery (Highway 128, Orange County, the M4 Corridor). Third, while some factors (climate, educational quality and spending, the presence of major company headquarters and business services) appear important in long-term location decisions, others (wage rates, unionization) appear to be less important. A critical factor is the presence of organized R & D, meaning that access to a major university or government research establishment can prove important; however, it is not any research that proves crucial, but especially government-funded research. Fourth, in the United States and Great Britain defence contracting appears to have played a crucial role. Why these contracts should have gone not to older industrial cities, but to cities outside the traditional manufacturing areas, proves to be far from simple.

Finally, a critically important factor seems to be the so-called innovative milieu (Aydalot 1986a, b, 1988; Aydalot and Keeble 1988a, b; Andersson 1985a, b, Andersson and Strömquist 1988): certain places, at certain times prove uniquely innovative in terms of technology or industrial organization, and thereby generate new industrial traditions. They may be older industrial centres which revitalize themselves, but often they are new centres. The circumstances of their gestation are not entirely clear, but a key role seems to be played by synergy between individuals and organizations. Such synergy may arise more easily in certain types of economic environment - for instance, in cities with many small workshops - than in others.

Informational Services

The informational services sector has some locational affinities with informational manufacturing, but in other respects follows a divergent path. First, higher-level producer services remain concentrated in the cores of the most highly-developed central metropolitan areas of the most highly-developed national economies (London, Paris, New York). Here, they may be either separate of they may be internalized in headquarters offices or as specialist subdivisions of large corporations. If the latter, they may decentralize a very short distance from headquarters (e.g. research laboratories to a semi-rural location on the urban fringe) (Daniels 1985; Gillespie and Green 1987; Marshall 1988). Second, routine producer services (e.g. some financial services such as insurance, or credit card operations) may decentralize some distance to "back offices" in smaller centres, though they may still be within easy travelling distance of the major metropolitan centre (e.g. Croydon or Reading in South-East England; the Paris new towns; Stamford, Connecticut; Tysons Corner, Virginia; Concord-Walnut Creek-San Ramon-Pleasanton-Dublin, California) in search of lower rents and for a supply of the right kind of non-organized, reasonably well-educated female clerical labour (Baran 1985; Nelson 1986; Mills 1987). Third, it is possible that certain types of "head office"activity are now decentralizing also. Some observers think that the U.S. may be witnessing the development of "poly-nucleated" cities on the Los Angeles model, in which the traditional downtown is only one of a number of major IT-processing centres. Improved IT technology could of course contribute powerfully to this process.

Fourthly, some older industrial cities may fail to develop significant producer-service concentrations; while European provincial capitals (München, Frankfurt, Grenoble, Norwich) and smaller national nodal centres

(New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles) have grown less rapidly than the next level of the hierarchy, the regional nodal centres (Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Houston, Minneapolis, Phoenix); while traditional manufacturing headquarters ("functional-nodal") cities (like Pittsburgh and Detroit) have lost ground badly (Noyelle and Stanback 1984; Stanback 1985).

The New Locational Logic

There is, therefore, a new locational logic for the informational industries. In some ways it resembles the old Weberian theory of location for manufacturing industries. It depends on the costs of information transfer, whether in the form of packages, or electronic impulses, or the physical movement of brains and the rather weightier bodies that unfortunately have to travel with them. There is also an equivalent for the old agglomeration principle, but it is now rather more subtle. Agglomeration for the information industries has quite another dimension: it actually contributes to their growth, through a process of constant innovation in what the late Philipe Ayhdalot called an innovative milieu (Aydalot 1986a; Aydalot and Keeble 1988a; cf. Andersson 1985, b).

The new logic is dominated by the controlling producer services and corporate headquarters cities: London, New York, Tokyo. these world cities increasingly relate more to each other than to the rest of the world. They sit in the centres of vast and spreading metropolitan regions, within which more routine informational functions are constantly banished to more peripheral low-cost suburban locations (Castells 1989, 151, 169).

Yet, as just noticed, European and American work seems to suggest that some of the best performers are the second-rank cities serving prosperous semi-rural regions. And this is augmented by the decentralization of functions from the top-level metropolitan centres to cheaper locations in their rural hinterlands, such as Reading, 70 kilometres west of London, Stamford in Connecticut a similar distance from midtown Manhattan, the so-called I-680 corridor in the San Francisco Bay Area, and places like Tysons Corner in the Washington DC area. They handle two major kinds of process: research and development, and large-scale routine electronic data input, processing and retrieval. Activities requiring a great deal of skilled judgement or creative activity, in contrast, continue to command expensive space in the cores of the metropolitan areas. So there is a constant tension, in these places, between the centripetal and the centrifugal principles. But, because the more routine part employs many more people, the tendency in general is for activity to migrate out.

3. The emergence of an urban underclass

In the transition to the new economy, however, not everyone is successful. The speed of deindustrialization, and of the shift to the informational economy, has been extraordinary; it has essentially occurred within a quarter-century, especially the period since 1975. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the process has left a minority of the population unable to compete. Those with inadequate or inappropriate skills - above all older industrial workers who have lost their jobs, and younger workers lacking the necessary minimum educational requirements - find themselves reduced to a series of temporary jobs separated by long periods of unemployment. And in turn this makes the younger workers less attractive as marriage prospects, leading to a process of progressive collapse of traditional family structures. The resulting spiral of decline precipitates the out-movement of those who have employment prospects and stable family relations, leading to the progressive ghettoization of those that remain; as

middle-class role models disappear, the plight of this ghetto progressively worsens, its population stigmatized as unemployable. This is the thesis of William Julius Wilson, whose book The Truly Disadvantaged (Wilson 1987) has set off a major debate and an entire tradition of research in the United States. What is however significant is that the Wilson hypothesis, as he has recently recognized, essentially applies to about a dozen old industrial cities in the mid-west and mid-Atlantic divisions of the United States. Although some parallel processes are occurring in the more dynamic metropolitan areas of the south and west, the full spectrum of problems cannot be identified there.

The significance, precisely, is that these older deindustrializing cities are the ones identified by Noyelle and Stanback as performing most poorly in the 1970s and early 1980s. They have not made the transition to the informational economy. Similarly, though work on the underclass phenomenon is much less developed in Europe, research on local economies in Britain suggests that the plight of the disadvantaged, though everywhere serious, is somewhat better in dynamic economies than in declining ones (Boddy et al 1987; Buck and Gordon 1987). This however, is complicated by the fact that increasingly, the dynamic economies are found far distant from the urban cores where the underclass is stranded.

4. Deconcentration and Reconcentration

It appears that, beginning in North America and in a few parts of western Europe in the 1950s, and gradually extending to the whole of western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, there is a very general trend for population to decentralize from the older urban cores into suburbs and eventually also into exurbs, and for employment to follow them. This is often associated with what geographers call a movement down the urban hierarchy, away from larger cities and towards smaller ones, often nearby. And it may eventually result in an apparent reversal of the long-continued migration from farm to city, which began at the time of the first industrial revolution.

In the United States, just over a decade ago, Daniel Vining wrote a celebrated series of papers arguing that there, demographic trends indicated what he called a complete break with the past: the two-hundred-year old pattern of movement from farm to city had been reversed, so that for the first time on record so-called non-metropolitan areas - basically, areas outside the sphere of influence of major cities - were growing faster than metropolitan areas (Vining and Kontuly 1977, Vining and Strauss 1977, Vining 1982, Vining, Pallone and Yang 1982). And, almost simultaneously, research from the Rand Corporation showed that though about one half of this growth represented a fringe phenomenon, whereby people moved to areas just outside the statistically-defined metropolitan area, about one half consisted of the growth of genuinely small and remote places, well away from the major urban areas (McCarthy and Morrison 1977).

Subsequently, there has been a great deal of controversy about the trends and their interpretation. Some have pointed out that data for the 1980s point to a sharp slowing of the growth of the non-metropolitan areas, partly because many of the fastest-growing counties have been absorbed into the metros in the latest redefinitions. William Frey has shown that during 1980-85 the larger metropolitan areas have started to grow again, though not nearly as rapidly as in the 1960s. Further, there now seems to be very little difference in growth rates between the largest metro areas (with 1 million and more people) and smaller ones, or between metro and non-metro areas. What does emerge is a very strong regional effect, whereby in the 1980s metropolitan areas of all sizes (and also non-metropolitan areas)in the south and west grow much faster than those in the north (Frey

1988, 264-66). Even Vining has accepted that what he calls core regions - which are very large geographical aggregates, consisting of entire United States Census regions - have again resumed growth in the 1980s (Cochrane and Vining 1988).

However, none of this alters the fact that core cities in the United States have continued to lose massively by out-migration to their suburbs. And powerful evidence now suggests that this process has spread across Europe. Cheshire and Hay's analysis uses a standard statistical basis, at least as far as the data allow: this is the Functional Urban Region (FUR), a concept very similar to that of the familiar Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) used by American analysts. They conclude that "Decentralization has tended not only to 'spread' from larger to smaller FURs, it has also spread from the countries of Northern Europe to France and northern Italy and later to the countries of Southern Europe" (Cheshire and Hay 1989, 145; cf; Hall 1988). This pattern has proven to be remarkably stable over time: Cheshire and Hay predict that losses of core city populations, which occurred in northern Europe by the early 1970s (and in the UK as early as the 1950s) and in France and Northern Italy by the late 1970s, will occur also in southern Europe by the 1990s. By 1980, both the UK and Germany were dominated by population decline of their entire major urban regions, accompanied by continued out-movement from core to rind (ibid.)

The beneficiaries of this outward flow, in Western Europe, have been the smaller FURs with less than a quarter of a million people, more than 100 in number. Many of them are administrative centres fro rural areas, or resort and retirement towns. Nearly three-quarters of them showed population gains in the 1970s; more than two in five had gains of 5 per cent or more. (They are not however the smallest places, many of which are losing both people and employment). Again, many of these small-medium places showed population losses in their urban cores; but, even then, many of these places are growing as employment magnets. These fastest-growing areas, whether larger or smaller, are for the most part semi-rural: the hinterlands of the cities are quite rural in appearance, but they are not remote. On the contrary, they are often next door to the places that are deurbanizing. It is a reciprocal process: the big industrial cities' loss is their gain. We can speak of it as a process of recentralization of jobs in these smaller places, with local concentrations of residential populations around them; the resulting commuting distances are generally relatively short, certainly much smaller than in the giant metropolitan centres from whence these people came. South East England, where the fastest growth is occurring in medium-sized towns between 100 and 150 kilometres from London, is a prime example.

Part of this can be explained by evidence from the previous section: firms decentralize their more routine operations to the fringes of the global metropoles, in search of lower-cost labour and lower rents. But not all can be explained this way: South East England also includes innovative milieux, like the so-called M4 Corridor west of London or the Cambridge area, which constitute independent sources of growth. And the origins of these milieux prove very complex and elusive: while the M4 Corridor seems to have resulted from long-distance relocation out of London coupled with defence contracting, the so-called Cambridge phenomenon was an indigenous spinoff from university research that somewhat resembles its transatlantic cousin.

What is the basic engine that drives this decentralization process? There is compelling evidence that it is impelled by movements of people in search of more housing space at prices they can afford. The biggest metropolitan areas - what Noyelle and Stanback call the National

Nodal and Regional Nodal centres - show considerable dynamism, as we have seen. They attract in-migrants, who bid up housing prices. In general, the traditional house price gradient - declining from centre to edge - persists. In many North American metropolitan areas, and in an increasing number of European ones, it is however complicated by large areas of inner city blight, occupied by low-income groups, often relative newcomers. (This phenomenon will be considered below). That means that there is an additional incentive to outward movement on the part of middle-income, middle-lifecycle households who are in the family-building age group. They are willing to endure some sacrifice, in the form of long commutes, to obtain the kind of housing they want at prices they can afford. This is why there is clear evidence, in many major metropolitan areas, that the zone of maximum "suburban" growth is now up between 60 and 120 kms from the metro centre.

It is of course no longer suburban in a traditional sense, because at these distances only a minority of the resident population makes the long-haul commute back to the downtown. As already noticed above, very soon local employment growth absorbs a majority of the workforce, including many of the former commuters. The jobs themselves for the most part do not move; rather, the local economies expand to absorb the newcomers. A study published in 1986 estimated that in outer South East England, by the end of ten years, well over one-half and perhaps three-quarters were absorbed in this way (Buck, Gordon and Young 1987). This seems to be a very important conclusion, and it is certainly replicated in other metropolitan areas. But we do not understand the reasons why: in these places, local economies grow in complex ways that require much more research.

Such centres of reconcentrating job growth can actually be created by deliberate agency. Britain did that with the original new towns, just after World War II. Those around London were extraordinarily successful, returning many times the original public investment in them. The French adopted the same formula around Paris in the mid-1960s, with the same results. Much more recently, there has appeared a distinctly American variant, developed by private capital. Places like Arlington between Dallas and Fort Worth in Texas, or Mesa outside Phoenix in Arizona, have recently been cited as examples of "supersuburbs" (Dillon, Weiss and Hait 1989). On the drawing boards in California are half a dozen private new towns proposed in the Central Valley, between 50 and 80 miles from downtown San Francisco; they would all have major commercial development as well as jobs. Like the example of Tysons Corner, which I mentioned earlier, they are huge new commercial centres having many, but not all, of the attributes of a traditional downtown. They have come into existence almost overnight: Tysons's Corner, a supermarket and grocery store only twenty years ago, is now the largest downtown in Virginia. They signify the fact that informational activities, deconcentrating from traditional metropolitan centres, almost immediately find the need to recapture the traditional advantages of agglomeration - even when, as in several of these cases, they thereby recreate the same traffic congestion that they thought they were leaving behind.

These supersuburbs - they have also been called urban villages - are in many ways the most startling recent American contribution to the evolution of urban form. The problem is that all too many of them are one-sided: they are pure agglomerations of office blocks, whose sole advantage is that they are cheap to rent, surrounded by amorphous suburbs. For the people who come to work in them, they may represent a parking lot and a corridor to the office, nothing more. And the growing problems of automobile-based suburb-to-suburb (and even exurb-to-exurb) commuting threaten to strangulate these centres soon after birth.

Some of the proposed Californian developments at least promise antidotes. The most significant of these embrace the idea of pedestrian-scale neighbourhoods, or "pedestrian pockets", in which living and working would be combined; they are also based on proposed transit routes. They represent a throwback, conscious or unconscious, to the idea of developing high-density concentrations of housing and jobs around transit stops, as variously developed thirty or more years ago by Stockholm and Toronto, and more recently by Paris and Ottawa. It remains to be seen, however, how successful they will prove in practice.

5. The trend to megalopolis?

What seems to be happening, as a result of these worldwide trends, is the development of belts of fairly widespread growth in basically rural areas: the English "Sunbelt" from Dorset to Suffolk, the south German corridor from Heidelberg via Stuttgart and Ulm to Munich, the Mediterranean coast of France and Spain, from Monaco to Nice and on to Barcelona and Valencia, the "Zip strip" along the Interstate-95 corridor in New Jersey and the 200-mile corridor between Sacramento and Visalia in California's Central Valley. Some, like the south German or the Californian examples, follow major and very old-established corridors of movement by road and rail; others, like the British example, actually cut across the grain of the major corridors. Some can be regarded as "central" in that they link major established urban centres; others appear to be more "peripheral".

Yet we are not seeing the formation of vast, sprawling Megalopolises, as Lewis Mumford forecast over fifty years ago (Mumford 1938, 223-299). Gottmann's 1961 vision, "an almost continuous stretch of urban and suburban areas from southern New Hampshire to northern Virginia and from the Atlantic shore to the Appalachian foothills" - was not true, then or now. The cities remain physically quite separate, and many of them remain quite small. They are surrounded by wide areas of open countryside. Indeed, that is part of their attraction: they remain country towns.

But the functional reality is different: a very complex network of economic and social relationships, in which some people may have close and regular relationships with the central city, while others - even members of the same household - may have very few. This calls into question the whole concept of the Statistical Metropolitan Area, which is based on regular ties to a single urban core; in the most highly urbanized regions - South East England, the Northeastern Corridor of the United States, Central California - the map of metropolitan areas becomes a mass of contradictory criss-cross movements superimposed on each other, rather like one of those electronic maps that become a blur of light. A husband may commute to one place, a wife to another, they shop in a third place for some items, a fourth and a fifth for others; they have a country place 200 kilometres distant, and patronize the country inns and restaurants there; they travel regularly on business or on vacation to cities in distant continents, which they know as well as their nearest town. They have no primary focus, no main geographical loyalty, no strong repetitive pattern, such as characterized daily urban life until a few years ago. Melvin Webber's Nonplace Urban Realm (Webber 1963) may be at last becoming a reality.

6. Competition between cities

The final trend is a growing tendency for cities to market and promote themselves, in effect, rather like competing brands of breakfast cereal or automobile. Underlying this are a number of other trends, some of which have already been identified: the growing globalization of internationalization of the economy, especially affecting the uppermost levels of the urban hierarchy which compete to attract headquarters

offices; the increasing significance and cheapness of telecommunications, which makes it possible for many information-handling functions to be carried out almost anywhere; the growth of tourism, including business tourism, which may be based on qualities that can be artificially generated (such as the presence of a convention centre or exhibition complex); and the challenge represented by deindustrialization, making it necessary for cities either to compete in the new informational economy or to face slow decay.

The chances in this competition are not of course perfectly equal. Cities that are central in relation to the general pattern of economic activity in a country or a continent will be favourable placed. (But centrality is a highly relative term: what may be peripheral at one spatial scale may be central at another. London is peripheral to Great Britain but central in relation to Britain-in-Europe). Cities that possess some pre-existing nodality or accessibility, such as a major airport or a junction point on a new high-speed train network, have a definite advantage over cities that lack these attributes; notice how Atlanta grew with its airport, while neighbouring Birmingham (Alabama) was eclipsed. Cities with a long historical tradition as cultural or tourist centres, preferable both, will have a clear advantage over heavy industrial cities; and so on. But these qualities only convey certain probabilities of success; any city can play, and there have been some surprising conversions in recent years: Glasgow has been voted European Cultural City 1990, Birmingham has converted itself from a metal-bashing centre into a major focus for business tourism, Lille is about to exploit its position as junction-point of the European TGV rail system, Dortmund and Bochum in the Ruhr district have become major universities and research centres, and so on.

The specific point is that these cities are competing not merely for transient tourist trade, but as locations for economic activity and thus for people. And one of the main ingredients that they have to sell is their quality of life. This, as well as pure civic pride and emulation, surely provides one main reason for the enormous stress that cities everywhere now place on physical appearance, especially in their downtown areas. European cities tend to have taken some kind of world lead here, with attractive pedestrian downtowns served by efficient public transit. And in turn they have provided a model for cities in many other parts of the world.

THE SEARCH FOR URBAN QUALITY

It is time to bring these trends into some kind of relationship, and to ask what they mean for the elusive issue of quality of urban life.

First, the declining importance of the nuclear family mans that the model established forty years ago is no longer a dominant one. Most people today live in household groupings that do not presuppose a need for a family house in the suburbs. Nevertheless, the overwhelming evidence is that most households find they need this, at least at one stage of the life cycle, and in many cases for most of their lives.

Secondly, this then directly relates to the decentralization phenomenon. Some of these people might prefer to live in a remodelled house in the central city or its older suburbs; but, unless they can obtain this in a prestigious area (which, by definition, only a minority can), they will migrate to the urban fringe to find it at a price they can afford. It is very clear that most household units, at this point, are making some trade-off along the accessibility/quality spectrum. Many are sacrificing accessibility for quality, in that they are tolerating commutes well in excess of the conventional one-hour maximum. Many however, are subsequently

adjusting quite quickly as the local economy grows around them, providing a wider range of accessible jobs. As to quality of life, almost definitionally these households find that the tradeoff is worthwhile; they would rather occupy a new house, in a homogeneous neighbourhood with the right kind of schools for their children, and with easy finance, than take the multiple risks of gentrifying an inner city neighbourhood. That most people are risk-averse in these circumstances should not be surprising; this is after all the most responsible decision most of them will ever take. All this is not to deny the phenomenon of gentrification; only to say that, on all the evidence, it nowhere seems to affect more than a minority of households.

Thirdly, the new informational jobs are also relocating in these same new suburban areas, albeit with a time lag; typically, in the largest metropolitan areas, one might generalize that the residential fringe is thirty miles (and perhaps twenty years) in front of the employment fringe. They are being established there for the same hard-headed reasons as the new homes are: land is cheaper there, salaries may well be somewhat lower (because of the reduced commuting burden), and consequently overall operating costs may typically be only one-half of those in downtown areas.

It is a moot point, and also a subjective one, as to whether the quality of working life is thereby enhanced, or not. On the plus side, these are new offices that are well-designed and offer generally good work environments; greatly superior, by any measure, to that of the typical factory worker of the previous era. Workers in them may suffer from some specific occupational disorders, such as Repetitive Stress Injuries, but these can hardly compare with the toll taken by factories in the industrial era. Generally, too, it can be argued that social and personal relationships in the new economy are superior to those in the old. The decline in the power of trades unionism may well be a sign of this.

On the minus side, it should not be ignored that the informational economy, like the industrial economy, includes a large proletariat. These workers, predominantly female, do the most routine jobs, are the most prone to stress injuries, are weakly organized and are therefore easily displaced by cheaper workers in other locations. It might be argued that only now, in the current severe global recession, are the labour relationships of the new informational economy being tested. Again, these suburban workers tend often to be isolated from shopping and other services; and they demand access by car, often over highways that rapidly become congested. However, since the highways leading back to downtown are likely to be even more congested, the direction of the tradeoff at the margin is again obvious.

Fourthly: it may become even sharper, because of the underclass phenomenon. Its significance is that it throws the traditional inner city into very sharp relief, in which derelict urban war zones may exist a few blocks from up-market gentrified areas. However, the evident racial and social tensions that now exist in some American cities - well illustrated by Tom Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities - may well mean that inner-city life becomes tolerable only for those rich enough to insulate themselves physically and socially from the pressures. Wolfe's upper-middle-class characters, for instance, will neither walk nor ride the subway; they take limousines. Such solutions are not open to the great middle-income majority, who will find flight from the city an acceptable alternative. The major question is whether this extreme polarization pattern will extend to non-American cities also. There are minor signs of it in London and Paris, but certainly not on the American scale.

Fifthly: the new megalopolitan urban form, with multiple downtowns set amidst multiple suburbs, is well adapted to a world in which most households contain at least two earners whose skills and job requirements are likely to differ. It satisfies the basic need for choice, particularly the choice to trade jobs when the need or the opportunity arises. Insofar as the downtowns are new and built in the expectation of certain rates of commercial return, the pattern may lead to a certain monotonous homogeneity: a world dominated by the same chain stores. Insofar as older centres remain inside the urban matrix - as in Europe, or on the Northeastern seaboard of the United States - they may provide varied kinds of service (small specialty shops) which relieve the monotony. There is considerable evidence, indeed, that where they exist such specialized centres increasingly become the up-market components of the system, leaving the new shopping malls to cater for more routine needs.

Finally, the competition between cities - which by and large takes the form of trying to revive and enhance those traditional urban qualities - provides powerful supportive evidence for the thesis that the more people leave the city behind, the more they value it for certain special qualities. This immediately raises the difficult question: what exactly are these characteristics, that older urban centres are said to possess and newer centres do not? The answer must be highly subjective; it can vary greatly between individuals and between cultures. Yet people from difference cultures will tend to agree that some urban places - St. Mark's Square, the Place des Vosges in Paris, Heerengracht - have a special quality; that is why they travel long distances as tourists to see them. And these same tourists throng to other less architecturally distinguished streets - Kalverstraat in Amsterdam, the Stroget in Copenhagen, Marienplatz in Munich - because they find human qualities in them. It is the same with many main streets in North American campus towns - Telegraph Avenue in Berkely, Harvard Square, Westwood Village in Los Angeles - which may be good, indifferent or downright bad architecturally, but share an elusive quality of urban excitement.

Researchers have made some generalizations about these good urban spaces: there is a subtle ratio between the height of buildings and the width of the street, a certain range of architectural variation, a relationship between the progression of buildings and intervening spaces and the flow of people past them. But these qualities are not susceptible to any kind of rigorous scientific analysis: analysis here remains an art rather than a science.

There is another notable fact: many of the best-loved streets, especially in older cities, do not work well in a functional planning sense. The narrow medieval alleys of Naples, or Seville or Verona, or Barcelona, are a total disaster in terms of circulation or servicing: whether left open to vehicles or pedestrianized, they offer a choice between inconvenience and environmental degradation. Yet such streets are much visited by locals and tourists alike; and they are clearly well liked.

Good, interesting urban environments do not have to be old: in the last two decades, designers have become increasingly successful in creating new urban environments that work well and feel good. The big North American exercises in urban revitalization, such as Boston's Waterfront, Baltimore's Inner Harbour, or Vancouver's Granville Island, provide notable examples. We need a careful analysis of what makes these successful developments work, and their applicability elsewhere. The first point is that many of their patrons come from far-distant metropolitan regions: they belong to Melvin Webber's Nonplace Urban Realm. The new urban spaces, like the old ones, have become major tourist attractions: Baltimore's Inner Harbour attracts as many tourists as the

California Disneyland. They are also magnets for suburbanites from the local metropolitan area, who seem to find in such places a quality they lack in their own suburban milieu.

In either case, the point is that these offer a very specialized urban experience: the shopping and the entertainment are perfectly and professionally focused on the demands of tourists, and there is no attempt - the reverse, in fact - to provide a normal range of shopping facilities. They do not aim to compete with suburban shopping malls, so much as provide a different experience.

Virtually all of these developments, interestingly, have contained a related residential component, sometimes rehabilitated (Boston), sometimes mainly new (Baltimore); but these residents use the commercial core only for entertainment, doing their routine shopping elsewhere. The point, already made, is that the Nonplace Urban Realm does not mean the abolition of place, or the special character of place. The revival of the metropolitan cores signifies that even in the largest and most apparently amorphous metropolitan region, places and their cultural significance will still matter.

That thesis is supported by the fact that European cities have begun to follow the Boston and Baltimore model. Most had great wholesale food markets - Covent Garden in London, Les Halles in Paris - which became vacant on relocation during the 1970s. Not without controversy, they have been rebuilt or rehabilitated to become a new kind of tourist attraction. Port cities like London, Liverpool, Manchester and Rotterdam all saw their inner dock areas close down during the same decade, victims of containerization and the downstream migration of the port function. They have responded by a mixture of historic rehabilitation and new construction, which exploits the unique waterside environment and brings together commercial development, shopping, hotels, housing, marinas and recreation. London's St. Katherine's Dock and Wapping, Liverpool's Albert Dock, Bristol's old dock area, Salford's quays and Rotterdam's Oude Haven all provide models; Manchester's Irwell, where James Rouse in involved - together with the neighbouring museum quarter, already created out of old industrial buildings - soon will provide another spectacular example.

Like their American models, in the strict sense these developments are synthetic: they represent the reconstruction of a history that never existed in this form. The dockland areas were harsh places of intense manual toil. Now, they are the reverse: they house boutique shops, art galleries, hotels, museums and luxury housing. Yet visitors are attracted by the restored early industrial architecture, by the imagined links with the past, and by the lure of water and the romance of seafaring. Whatever the combination of motives, this is a profound geographical transformation: the cores of the old industrial and port cities, relics of the first industrial revolution, now act as magnets for mass tourism in the post-industrial (more accurately, informational) age. Tourism has not only provided a new basic urban industry to help compensate for lost goods-handling jobs: it has transformed the vision of the industrial city, thus reasserting the traditional qualities which cities make to the average person.

A different model of urban revitalization comes from the downtowns of many European cities, especially in Germany. Here, virtually every city has pedestrianized its commercial core, simultaneously investing large sums in rail transit systems, generally by upgrading their existing tram networks into light rail systems, and undergrounding them under the city centre streets. The result is a traditional city centre, physically transformed to meet the standards of

an affluent late 20th-century society, and easily accessible without a car.

Other European cities are following the German model. Mass transit - in the form of metro or light rail systems - is seen as the key, providing a comfortable, convenient alternative to the car, the use of which can thus be restrained. Meanwhile, the Dutch and the Germans and the Danes have gone even further, seeking to calm urban traffic by speed restrictions and physical obstacles. The European city - this is the implied philosophy - is a very special kind of place. Therefore, instead of trying to reshape the city around the car, we should reshape the use of the car around the city. People appear to accept this, because they need the unique experience that only the traditional city can give them.

There is one anecdotal piece of evidence here: in the postwar urban reconstruction of German cities, certain sections were consciously rebuilt and redeveloped as centres for entertainment, for eating and drinking, and for nightlife. These areas - the Alstadt in Düsseldorf, Sachsenhausen in Frankfurt, the Burg in Nürnberg - were among the oldest sections of their cities, and they had a unique, almost village-life charm. The planners sought to capture and to enhance this quality, by restrictions on the type of development and the type of commercial exploitation, and by restrictions - earlier than in other city sections - on car use. These areas have been outstandingly successful, not only for their own citizens, but also for the flows of tourists, including business tourists, that visit them.

Another, very different, model of urban quality is represented by new town centres like Britain's Milton Keynes or the campus new town of Louvain-la-Neuve in Belgium; the latter is an outstandingly successful creation of the qualities of a traditional city centre through planning. Further, these are very ordinary kinds of places, intensively and regularly used by large numbers of very varied people: unlike the Bostons and the Baltimores, they are in no sense exotic tourist environments. But, like them, they get a great deal of wear and tear.

There is another urban innovation, first developed in Canada but copied in Europe: the super-shopping mall, represented by West Edmonton Mall in Alberta and by Metro Centre (Gateshead) and Meadowhall (Sheffield) in England. This is nothing less that the attempt to create a new kind of instant urban place, which combines shopping and entertainment: a kind of shopping centre in a theme park, again created instantly on an open site. (Gateshead and Meadowhall, incidentally, are not greenfield sites but pieces of restored derelict industrial land). These few examples offer a kind of challenge to the Louvain-la-Neuve model, in that they consciously reject any attempt to create a traditional urban form. Since all three seem to be highly successful, we can expect to see more examples.

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URBAN GROWTH AND THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE: A COMMENTARY WITH CANADIAN EXAMPLES

Larry S. Bourne

The fluidity of the urban growth process continues to fascinate and frustrate researchers and policy-makers alike. We are challenged both by the complexity and uncertainty of growth, and by the apparent contradiction between the rapidity of socio-economic change in cities on the one hand and the seeming permanence of existing urban systems and built environments on the other hand. Just when we feel that we are beginning to come to grips with one set of documented trends, the urban system shifts to another trajectory. This, in turn, produces a new set of relationships and a rather different geography of growth and change. Understanding these shifting patterns of urban growth, their socio-economic origins and consequences, and their policy implications, therefore, clearly requires a careful monitoring and continuing re-assessment of the urban process.

The Context: Structural Change

As a contribution to this understanding, Peter Hall has provided us with an articulate, wide-ranging and provocative overview of recent trends in urban development within both North America and western Europe. As a starting point, he identifies six major structural shifts and describes their implications for the ways in which people live and work, and more generally for the quality of life, in large metropolitan regions. These six shifts are:

1) the decline of the nuclear family;
2) the shift from a goods-handling to an information-processing economy;
3) the emergence of an urban underclass;
4) the decentralization of people and jobs from city to suburb and from large to small urban areas;
5) the formation of linear belts of urban growth; and
6) the emerging competition between cities.

These are all reasonable propositions, for which substantial supporting evidence can be found. But, as with all generalizations, there are always omissions and exceptions. In this paper I first undertake a critical assessment and elaboration of his assertions, then offer a brief review of their applicability to the Canadian urban scene and finally suggest some of the additional issues that will face urban Canada in the future.

In my view Professor Hall's six structural trends may be more accurately described as two structural trends, one relating to changes in life style and demography and the other to changes in production and financial systems, and four sets of social and spatial consequences that are associated with these trends. The first two can be called macro-structural shifts and in broad outline both are universally applicable within the mature industrial economies (Bannon, et al 1991). The greatest variability among countries comes in the four associated consequences, some of which - as will be argued below - are not as relevant for urban Canada as they are, for example, in the U.S. or Europe.

The first shift cited, the decline of the nuclear family, is certainly universal, but it should be immediately qualified and then broadened to include other socio-demographic trends. The qualification is that the decline of the nuclear family is relative; relative to the truly remarkable changes that have taken place during the post-war period in rates of new household formation and in the increasingly diverse

choices of living arrangements. The decline in average household size and the rapid increase in the proportion of non-traditional (eg non-family) households in Canada since the 1950s are well documented (Miron, 1988). Less well known and understood are the consequences of such transitions for cities and living environments. The fact that less than half of all households are now family households, and that nearly half of those households are not nuclear families, is clearly significant for a wide range of public goods and services. Of equal importance are the changing attributes and composition of both types of households. In many Canadian cities, for example, reduced household size has stripped otherwise stable neighbourhoods of as much as 25 percent of their population. The composition of that population now includes more elderly and single parent households, split families and fewer children. This in turn has reordered the complex relationships between households and their immediate environment by altering the nature and timing of the demand for housing, schools, social services and business and retail facilities. One result has been a growing mis-match between the built environment, the basket of local public goods available, and the needs of the population.

Equally significant have been two other socio-demographic changes which should be brought in to broaden the discussion. The first is the continued aging of the populations of all western industrial economies, but particularly that of Canada. Population aging is (and will continue to be) particularly rapid over the next two decades because of the sharp contrast between the size of the baby-boom population (proportionally the largest in the western world) and the much smaller cohort of the subsequent baby-bust population. The second trend is the rapidly changing ethno-cultural mix in most of the larger metropolitan areas in Canada. Almost 80 percent of all immigrants now come from non-traditional sources (Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America), and over 60 percent of those settle in the larger metropolitan areas. The aging trend has a number of direct and relatively obvious consequences for both public and private sectors that will continue to send ripples through the economy and social order over the next decade or more. An older population, for example, moves house and changes job less frequently, saves more and spends differently. The second trend, toward a more diverse, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic urban society, is at least as significant as the demographic transition, but its direct consequences for urban growth and the quality of urban life - beyond the visible and superficial changes - have yet to be systematically assessed.

These shifts in life style, age, demographic structure and socio-cultural composition are also closely interwoven with changes in the economy, notably in terms of labour markets. They influence the kinds (and locations) of jobs that people hold, skill levels, labour force participation rates and the resulting distribution of income. For example, an older population on balance is more experienced and skilled, but not necessarily in the skills most in demand; an older labour force also tends to slow the rate of labour market adjustment and thus to retard economic efficiency. At the same time a more ethnically diverse labour force both enhances and complicates efforts to encourage labour market evaluation and retraining.

One additional dimension of social change on which I place considerable stress, and one that is frequently overlooked, is the crucial role played in urban development over the post-war period of increasing levels of prosperity, in the form of higher real incomes. Until the early 1980s average incomes increased in real terms, from both employment sources (wages and salaries) and through transfers to and among individuals (eg pensions, gifts in kind). This contributed to (or at least facilitated) massive changes in the amount of space (land and housing) consumed, increased travel and labour mobility, and wider choices of living arrangements and residential

environments. The trend to lower residential densities, the widespread suburbanization of jobs and housing, the proliferation of suburban shopping centres, neighbourhood upgrading and inner city gentrification, have clearly been a function of increasing disposable income, operating in conjunction with macro-structural shifts in occupational structures, demography and public policy. Higher incomes and greater mobility have also allowed certain households, and some firms, to make locational decisions that reflect quality of life considerations rather than narrow economic imperatives.

Further, I would argue that post-war shifts in household composition have contributed to a redefinition of some of the long-standing linkages between the household, as the basic unit of consumption, the worker and the production sector. These linkages are again most evident through the operation of the labour market and in the consumption of collective public goods. By this I mean that the fragmentation of households into smaller and smaller units, combined with higher labour force participation rates, has redistributed national income among the nation's consuming units. Consequently household income has grown much more slowly than per capita income, and has become more skewed. Most households are not only smaller, but a majority (64%) have two (or more) wage earners, while an increasing proportion have no earners. One's economic status is now determined almost as much by the composition of the household as by the occupations of its members. Even if average household size stabilizes in the 1990s, as expected, this fragmentation will continue to alter the distribution of real income and prosperity in the future. One immediate result, although the empirical evidence here is inconsistent, is that we have seen not only a reordering of income distributions but an increasing polarization of living standards that is to the disdvantage of certain types of households (Statistics Canada, 1989; Bourne, 1990; Urban Institute, 1991). Unfortunately, those disadvantaged households also tend to be the most rapidly growing types. The decline in real incomes during the late 1980s, and the recession of the early 1990s, have undoubtedly added to this polarization.

The second major structural shift identified above, the shift from goods production to services and knowledge-based sectors, should also not be seen as a clean-break with the past. Rather, it is also part of a long-standing process of sectoral change and economic restructuring, although the rate of change may have accelerated during the 1980s. This rate, however, is unlikely to continue during the 1990s, given that the current recession has for the first time hit the service sector especially hard, and given the pressures for further public sector expenditure restraints. Nonetheless, even the initial assertion must be qualified. The shift to services can easily be exaggerated. Western societies are clearly producing and handling more goods than ever before. They are, however, doing so with far fewer hands and at much lower per unit costs, but with more capital. The shift to services has been particularly evident in statistics on employment composition, and somewhat less so for value added. The growth of employment in services, moreover, has often attracted workers not previously in the labour force - notably married women, new entrants and teenagers, many of whom are part-time - rather than shifting older workers out of other sectors. In parallel, proportionally more capital has flowed into creating the physical plants and equipment necessary for the production of services (eg office buildings) and to a lesser extent into those facilities for the reproduction of labour (eg education, housing), than into goods producing enterprises. Yet it should not be forgotten that goods production remains a major component of the national economy, a significant employer and a major consumer of investment capital. Trying to untangle the complex relationships involved here is a difficult task, but the dangers inherent in over-simplification are also considerable.

Associated Spatial Consequences

The other four structural shifts identified by Peter Hall - that I prefer to call the consequences of socio-demographic and macroeconomic shifts - could be discussed here in great detail. I will, instead, highlight the principal urban trends as I see them, add appropriate qualifiers, and indicate some of the potential uncertainties, before turning to a concluding summary of the implications of these trends for the Canadian scene. First is question of the emergence of an underclass; now a major issue of debate in the American urban and political studies literature. All observers agree that some individuals and households are invariably left behind by the processes of economic growth and restructuring, by social changes and by public policy. Undoubtedly, over time, some of the resulting inequalities are felt by the same people. Their poverty is perpetuated by their personal and family circumstances, living environments and locations, and then are passed on from one generation to another. Whether this continuity suggests the emergence of a distinctive underclass is debatable; that it is an important issue of social concern is not.

What is perhaps new, at least in the American context, and one of the reasons why the debate on the question of whether or not a distinct and separate underclass actually exists has become so prominent, is that these disadvantaged populations - the homeless, the sick and mentally ill, the drug sub-culture, the unemployed and the seemingly unemployable - are more geographically concentrated and visible, especially within the larger metropolitan regions. The majority are also black. Another reason is that some of the groups involved, notably the increasing drug-dependent population, are in fact relatively new and because of their condition appear to be permanently trapped in the world below the formal economy.

There is some evidence of the emergence of similar concentrations of severely disadvantaged households in Canadian cities, but not on the scale or with the severity and explicit racial associations of those in U.S. cities. Interestingly, such populations - and differentiating between these groups and the much larger low-income population - are not found primarily in the most depressed regions and metropolitan areas of the country. They are in fact proportionally more concentrated in the rapidly growing (and thus most expensive) urban areas of both the U.S. and Canada. Some of these individuals are in-migrants, attracted by (but unsuccessful in) the metropolitan labour market or by the availability of certain services and host communities. Most, however, appear to be continuing residents, marginalized by economic restructuring, family breakdown, deinstitutionalization, tight housing markets and the loss of rental housing, or substance abuse. Unfortunately, no one knows the relative proportions of these two population sources. In either case, it seems that rapid growth acts to attract, concentrate and then exacerbate urban poverty and social alienation.

The direct spatial consequences of these shifts for urban development, Hall's points 4 through 6, are also in most instances long-standing trends, but they too are the subjects of considerable debate. There is, for example, little doubt that population and jobs have continued to decentralize from city to suburb, and recently both have dispersed well beyond the traditional suburban margin. Many outlying rural communities have been transformed long before the arrival of suburban developers. There are frequent exchanges in the current urban literature about whether or not increased exurban dispersion in combination with extensive inner area revitalization and gentrification, have resulted in the creation of new post-modern urban forms (Knox, 1990; Bourne, 1991). Indeed Professor Hall spends

substantial time on recent trends in exurban development, on the reuse of urban land and the design of new landscapes and social spaces for commerce, leisure and tourism within western cities.

Although suburbanization itself is obviously not new, the recent mix of activities and populations, and the complex links between these activities are quantitatively, if not qualitatively different from those of earlier generations. These new urban forms are clearly more dispersed in terms of overall densities and commuting patterns. They are also more internally homogeneous and spatially segmented in terms of the locations and concentrations of similar types of firms, activities and social groups. They are thus more economically fragmented, more socially polarized and more difficult to analyze and understand. These features are in part attributable to the complexity of growth noted earlier, and in part to the corporatization of land development and the emergence of the comprehensively planned 'corporate' suburb. This does not mean, however, that these new urban areas are non-places, where residents have little or no sense of place, or shared geographical loyalties or localized patterns of travel behaviour. Instead it means that their living and activity spaces are much larger, more varied and diffuse and more functionally specialized.

At the same time, entire urban systems and their attenuated hierarchies of cities by size and function, have also been reorganized through the above demographic and economic changes. It is therefore not surprising that new sets of winners and losers, and new patterns of functional differentiation, have been created within the urban system. The urban size hierarchy has also been redefined, albeit slowly, and patterns of interurban flows and linkages between places have been altered. Some firms and functions, particularly those that are demand-driven and cost-sensitive, have diffused down the urban hierarchy, spreading from the larger metropolises to intermediate-size and even smaller places. Other functions, notably those in producer services and finance - in effect, the control and management functions for the national economy - have moved up the size hierarchy, becoming more concentrated in a few of the larger metropolitan areas. New transportation facilities (eg airports, trains) and communication linkages (eg computer networks) have made some urban places much more accessible while others have become more isolated and marginalized.

The particular balance between these varied and volatile concentration/deconcentration tendencies of course varies from country to country, and over time, as well as by the economic sector of interest. The balance also depends on the way that the study areas are defined. Yet even when the balance in urban population growth seems to be relatively uniform among different urban size categories the composition of that growth - for example, in terms of the type, level and quality of jobs available -may not be. Thus, even when population data suggests one spatial trend (eg toward deconcentration), other data on employment, economic power, interurban interactions and interurban dependency may indicate the reverse. Unfortunately, we have very poor data and few solid empirical analyses of the latter variables.

In the Canadian example, the winners and losers in the competitive sweepsteaks can be classified into three groups: those places that have been winners in the past and continue to be (eg. Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa, Calgary and until recently Montreal), because of their ability to extract the surplus product from other places in their regional hinterland or national urban system; those that are winners or losers only under certain economic conditions (eg specialized resource-based and industrial communities); and those that are perpetually

losers (eg Winnipeg in the west and Saint John in Atlantic Canada). The determination of the growth prospects for individual places depends increasingly on that city's position within the broader urban systems (regional, national and global) of which it is an integral part. Generally, it is those urban centres with diversified economies, and those that are also plugged in to the international urban system, directly or indirectly through their national metropolises, that have the highest potential for sustained growth in the future. Predicting which places these might be, however, is not as straight-forward as it may initially seem.

Interestingly, Professor Hall also makes reference to the emergence of a new locational logic in production - a logic primarily based on the needs of high-technology firms and high-order service industries. This logic, he argues, is played out in certain localities that have the appropriate combination of attributes, but in general it has lead to a further deconcentration of economic activity into smaller metropolitan areas and to the creation of linear "belts" of urban growth. Yet many of the principal examples given of rapidly growing urban areas are those whose economies are based not on production per se but rather on life style and demographic shifts (eg retirement, recreation and amenity-rich locations), or they are tourist and heritage areas or centres of government and public administration. This is certainly true in the Canadian case. During the most recent census period six of the nine most rapidly growing census metropolitan areas (CMAs) in the country were political capitals. In the U.S. during the 1980-88 period, for instance, 8 of the 10 most rapidly growing metropolitan areas (MSAs), albeit most of them are relatively small, were retirement locations (Frey, 1990). This evidence does not negate the importance in urban and regional growth of a new locational logic in production. Rather it suggests, first, that this logic is superimposed on older logics of production and thus its impacts are less easily identified. Second, it reconfirms the importance of the interactions between production and the new logic of consumption based on socio-demographic and life style changes, occupational structuring and increasing real incomes.

Further, the resulting new industrial spaces, that is the high-tech production complexes created by this new spatial logic, often are not located in peripheral regions or in entirely separate metropolitan areas. Instead, such complexes tend to be located on the outer margins of, or in close proximity to, existing metropolitan areas, especially those that have the amenities, social resources and cultural attractions that increasingly serve to define the dynamics of the consumption sphere and the quality of urban life. The obvious examples are Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay area, Route 128 near Boston, Orange County near Los Angeles and the M4 corridor between London, Reading and Bristol. The most obvious and only comparable examples in Canada, although on a smaller scale, are the Ottawa-Kanata axis, the 404 and 401 corridors north and west of Toronto and the Bromont corridor near Montreal.

The Scale Question

It is important in debating these trends to keep in mind the critical differences in geographical scale involved. Many urban scholars are not always consistent in differentiating between these scales, although the scales themselves are neither fixed nor mutually exclusive. Decentralization at one scale may contribute to centralization when measured at another scale. When, for example, does suburban decentralization reach a scale that it becomes a shift of growth within the national urban system, that is from one urban area to a different, functionally distinct and usually smaller urban area? Professor Hall is correct in asserting that some of the activities and employment moving out of the larger metropolitan areas are then re-concentrating in smaller and free-standing

centres. As such this may represent a process of deconcentration within the urban size hierarchy, and often a shift from the nation's core region to the periphery. However, some of the examples given suggest instead that suburbanization is continuing but on an ever larger spatial scale. To illustrate, reference is made to the movement of firms to Croydon and Reading in the U.K. and the new towns around Paris. Croydon, however, is clearly a suburban business centre located within metropolitan London; Reading, while physically separate, is increasingly tied to (and thus part of) greater London through commuting; and the Paris new towns were initially planned as integral components of the greater Paris metropolitan region, not as functionally separate urban areas. Thus relocations to these centres do not, in these terms at least, represent examples of the deconcentration of growth to new metropolitan centres within the urban system. Instead, as Hall suggests later in his paper, they point to the emergence of new and more dispersed metropolitan forms, as outlined above.

In Canada a few parallel examples will suffice to illustrate the difference between the intra-metropolitan and inter-metropolitan (ie urban system) scales. The relocation of a firm from Toronto to places such as Barrie or Guelph or Peterborough, all located near Toronto but outside the current census-defined metropolitan area, clearly does represent a shift from one urban area to another smaller centre within the region and within the nation's urban size hierarchy. But in fact this should not be taken as evidence of a process of deconcentration within the Canadian urban system. Rather, it too suggests the evolution of much larger and more diffuse metropolitan regions - what has been referred to as dispersed but functionally-linked urban growth - that is not captured by existing census definitions of metropolitan areas. These new regions may extend 100 kms or more from the urbanized core and are linked to that core not necessarily by daily commuting but by a sharing of the scale and urbanization economies and amenities of the larger metropolis. In other words, that firm would not be in Barrie if that city was not located in close proximity to (but not in) a major metropolitan region.

The other trend identified in Hall's paper, the emergence of geographically large linear belts of linked urban centres (previously called megalopolis), appears to be of limited applicability to the Canadian situation, especially outside of the Quebec to Windsor axis, because distances are too large and population densities are simply too low. What is more likely to occur is the continued intensification of interactions among 'networks' of metropolitan centres, at both regional (eg southern California, southern Ontario) and international scales, that offer complementary goods and services and that share inter-industry linkages.

Interurban Competition

As an extension to this trend, Professor Hall makes reference to the emerging competition between cities for economic growth. Drawing on the concepts of urban systems analysis we can rephrase and extend this line of argument. Interaction, and thus competition between cities, has always been part of the growth process within an urban system. Indeed, interaction is the key element in defining and analyzing such systems. As an historical example, urban boosterism has been an element of local economic development policies and strategies for civic improvement for a century or more. The examples of the intense competition between St. Louis and Chicago for dominance of the American mid-west in the mid-nineteenth century and later between Toronto and Montreal, Winnipeg and Edmonton, Edmonton and Calgary, and Calgary and Vancouver for dominance in the Canadian urban system, are well known.

Although interurban competition is not new, it is nonetheless likely that the nature and geographical scale of this competition has changed in line with two other sets of processes: first, global economic restructuring, the internationalization of trade and communication flows, and the expansion of multi-national corporations; and second with the increasing policy emphasis at the local scale on the economic benefits of quality of life and environmental conditions. Over the last decade or so inter-urban competition has certainly become more selective, with regard to the types of places and activities involved. It has also become more intense, more international in scope and more diverse with respect to the methods and instruments employed. This openness, this global interdependence, has simultaneously reduced the capacity of national governments to intercede in this competition and to ameliorate its negative consequences, but has made such interventions - when and where they occur - more crucial.

Reading the Canadian Scene: A Brief Synopsis

Most of the global trends outlined in Professor Hall's paper then are applicable in varying degrees to individual Canadian cities and to growth in the entire Canadian urban system, but with a number of significant differences. Some of those differences are a reflection of the particular historical origins and contemporary geography of urban Canada, others are matters of omission and emphasis. The following section briefly explores these differences as a way of concluding this review. No attempt will be made to offer a detailed description of recent growth trends in Canada (based on the 1986 Census) because of limited space and because this information is readily available elsewhere (eg Simmons and Bourne, 1989; Bunting and Filion, 1991).

As to questions of emphasis, I begin this summary by re-iterating the importance of the external relations of the urban system - that is, the degree to which urban growth is increasingly conditioned by events and decisions taken outside the country. This, as noted above, is part of the internationalization of economic activity, the globalization of capital markets, the diffusion of technology and accelerated immigration flows that affect all countries. The relative openness and regional specialization of the Canadian economy, its high trade-to-GNP ratio and its vulnerability to wide swings in world commodity prices, add further uncertainty and volatility to these equations for urban growth.

Despite this openness, and in part as a result of it, I also place considerable stress on the continuing role of governments - directly and indirectly - as participants in directing and managing the urban development process and as contributors to urban restructuring. Throughout the post-war period, governments in Canada, and to only a slightly lesser extent in the U.S., have influenced urban and regional growth patterns and the mix of winners and losers through an extensive array of activities, including trade agreements and taxation policies, institutional regulation (eg banks), procurement practices and decisions on the location of public investments and employment. Some of these urban impacts are the result of explicit policy decisions and intentional actions, as in the case of national urban policies, but many are the unintended consequences of other policy decisions. The growth of the U.S. sun belt, for example, has been driven by the differential impacts of tax changes, by agricultural support policies, by immigration, housing and employment legislation, by public transportation investments and by the varied activities of the U.S. Defence Department. The sun belt is also known as the gun belt. In Canada the list of relevant policies would be slightly different in order and emphasis, but would likely be even longer. Although most of the examples of policy

impacts given above fall under federal jurisdiction, the role of the provincial and state governments is equally substantial. In any case, the public sector has been, and continues to be, one of the major architects of changes in both the Canadian and American urban systems and in shaping the form and quality of growth within individual metropolitan areas.

How will this role change in the future? The increasing scale and intensity of the globalization of economic activity and the corresponding growth of interactions between cities across national boundaries, as argued above, means that the ability of the nation state to influence patterns of urban and economic growth using conventional means is significantly reduced. Any explicit attempt to influence those patterns, to stabilize regional economies and to ameliorate the negative consequences of variable urban and regional growth rates, will have to be more sophisticated, more closely co-ordinated and better targetted than they have been in the past. At the same time, the varied actions of all levels of government, especially provincial and local governments, will continue to exert very substantial effects on how aggregate growth is distributed at the local level and specifically on the resulting quality of life in each community.

In this regard, it would be most valuable to have a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the myriad of factors influencing the quality of work and residential life in Canadian cities. This analysis might include studies of recent and anticipated changes in occupational structures and the quality of the work-place, in housing opportunities and income distributions, and in the costs and benefitss of differential access to private and public services. In addition, some of the issues currently under debate in the environmental movement must be incorporated into any discussion of the quality of urban life. Specifically, we should acknowledge the linkages between urban economic development and the quality of the natural (and social) environments in which the vast majority of Canadians live. Further, we need to clarify the links between the new demographic and ethnocultural realities and their contributions to the quality of urban life.

Emerging Urban Trends

What, in conclusion, do these considerations suggest about the future patterns of urban development in Canada and with respect to the challenges facing individual metropolitan areas? For convenience, Table 1 provides a summary of (or at least one view of) the principal phases of urban growth in Canada in the post-war period. Although the details of the table need not be described here, the point should be re-iterated that quite different development trends can be observed over time and simultaneously at varying spatial scales. In particular, we require further research that attempts to sort out the differences in urban growth rates attributable to sector shifts (eg industrial decline, resource booms/busts), demographic change (eg population aging, migration), and public policy decisions, and to assess their spatial consequences in terms of regional decentralization (eg the shift of population to the west), deconcentration within the urban size hierarchy and the national urban system, and with respect to suburban-exurban decentralization.

Using the information in Table 1 as background, we can conclude that the Canadian urban system has not and is unlikely to change in the same degree and direction, and with the same consequences as the American system. One obvious reason for this difference is that Canada has less regional variation in economic structure and living environments, and more restrictions on and barriers to inter-regional trade, mobility and labour market restructuring than does the U.S. Examples of these restrictions include provincial procurement practices and

TABLE 1: MAJOR PHASES OF URBAN AND REGIONAL GROWTH: CANADA 1945-1990

Period	Early post-war 1945-1964	Later post-war 1965-1978	Recent 1978-1990
Geographical Trend/Scale	Urban boom and Concentration	Deconcentration and Decline	Reconcentration and Revitalizaion
National Economic and Demographic Systems	rapid population growth; high fertility (baby boom), high immigration; economy booming	declining rate of growth; lower fertility and immigration; intense economic restructuring, service-led growth and manufacturing decline	slower population growth; stable natural increase; aging population; service economy dominates growth, selective manufacturing revival
Level of Urbanization and Urban/Rural Balance	rapid increase in % urban; rural farm decline	stabilizing level (%) rural farm decline, rapid non-farm growth	stable level (75%); rapid rural farm decline, slower non-farm rural growth
Regional and Urban Systems	rapid growth in industrial heartland and selected resource locations; some growth almost everywhere	slower growth in heartland; rapid growth in many resource regions; decline elsewhere	renewed growth in heartland; slower growth in the west and resource periphery; decline widespread; retirement/leisure regions boom
Urban Size Hierarchy	massive concentration in metropolitan areas; most cities grew, relative decline of small towns	slower metropolitan growth; middle size cities growing rapidly (deurbanization); selective growth of small towns	modest metropolitan revival; city size influences growth; widespread small town decline, except in urban commuting fields and leisure areas
Intraurban Form and Development Patterns	highest growth in suburban areas; inner cities declining; slow growth on rural-urban fringe	rapid decentralization; outer suburbs and exurbs growing rapidly; jobs spreading to suburbs; core jobs increase, but population declines	continued rapid decentralization; outer suburbs and rural-urban fringe booming; downtown growth accelerates; central areas stable or growing slowly

employment regulations, transfer payments and equalization grants, and the effects of language on mobility rates. Canada also has, on the one hand, a smaller and more scattered rust-belt, with fewer large industrially-based urban areas (although there are variations on the same theme in Hamilton, Brantford, Sudbury, Sydney-Glace Bay) that have been made partially redundant by economic restructuring; and on the other hand it has no national equivalent of the U.S. sun belt (except perhaps on a small scale for the sun coast of BC and the Okanagan).

As a result, most new urban growth in the future will continue to be concentrated in the same four metropolitan regions as in the past: south-central Ontario, the Ottawa-Montreal-Quebec corridor, the Alberta corridor between Edmonton and Calgary and the lower mainland of BC. If new industry and investment shift from these regions, they will likely relocate outside the country rather than to other regions and certainly not to isolated small towns and rural areas. In parallel, and in part as a side-effect of this concentration - the immense problems facing rural and peripheral settlements within the Canadian urban system - especially those in the prairie provinces and the entire mid-north region - will persist, if not deepen. The urban system may actually shrink - in geographical terms - in the decades ahead as many peripheral settlements are down-sized or written-off.

At the local and regional levels, the decentralization of jobs and population will continue on an increasingly large spatial scale. New concentrations of employment and high-order services will appear in the outer suburbs and in smaller cities nearby. In many instances job movements may actually precede residential dispersion rather than the reverse, as traditionally assumed. The emergence of this new dispersed urban form, with development distributed over a 100 to 150 kilometre radius (but in a multi-nucleated pattern that can be called concentrated dispersion), enveloping existing towns and small cities in the process, will be largely confined to southern Ontario and Quebec, with smaller variations in the lower mainland of B.C. and central Alberta. Only in the areas around Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver, however, do we have a regional economic hinterland which is settled at densities, and with levels of local amenities comparable to those in western Europe and the U.S., that are necessary to attract further exurban development. Large parts of the landscapes of such regions may be rural in appearance, but are clearly urban in their life styles, economic base, functional linkages and patterns of land ownership. In most other parts of Canada there is much less scope for this kind and scale of decentralization, either because of the absence of aggregate urban growth (eg the Atlantic region), or the lack of suitable alternative locations in the immediate hinterland (eg the Prairies) or due to the presence of physical and environmental constraints on development (eg BC).

Within the country's metropolitan core regions the negative impacts of such dispersed urban growth may also be mediated, at least in comparison to the U.S., by three factors. The first is the relatively stronger controls exerted by governments at all levels in Canada on the urban development process in general and on the tendency to low-density suburban dispersion in particular. Decisions on investments in public transportation and regulation of the provision of serviced land for new developments have been instrumental in this regard. The second factor is the ability of provincial and regional governments to redistribute public resources among local jurisdictions so as to reduce the level of social inequalities that is typical within American metropolitan areas.

A third and related factor is the relative absence of the inner city social and racial strife that has encouraged the flight of population, capital and jobs from the central cities of metropolitan

America, often with devastating results. Nevertheless, we should expect to see a continued relative decline of the role of the CBD and central city in Canada as places of retail business and employment, but not necessarily as residential places. What is most likely to happen in urban Canada with respect to the social attributes of central cities is an increasingly sharp distinction between those urban areas in which the central core is undergoing social upgrading and those witnessing social downgrading. In the former situations lower-income households and new immigrants will be increasingly forced into the urban periphery; in the latter, inner city ghettoes may become more apparent. No single model of social change and differentiation is applicable here. Interestingly, some of the areas of most severe social stress in Canada in the future will be found in the lower-income suburbs, often in association with the social housing stock, and where social services are most sparse.

Returning to the original mandate of this paper, Professor Hall has provided us with an informative and stimulating overview of the changing dimensions of urban growth in western societies. One of the most interesting parts of his paper is the extended discussion of alternative planning models and design approaches to inner city revitalization and redevelopment, with examples drawn widely from across Europe (eg London docklands) and the U.S.(eg Baltimore harbor). In Canada we have similar but more modest examples in Toronto's Harbourfront and Garrison Common, Old Montreal and Granville Island in Vancouver. These developments are of both popular and professional interest, and they are certainly significant contributions for physical planning and the quality of urban public life, and from a local revenue generation point-of-view. But they are not necessarily models for other areas in the city or for all cities. Most are oriented to particular social groups and activities - often carnival-like leisure places - and thus cannot be easily extended or replicated. The reason for this qualification is that the potential demand for such specialized activities and urban spaces is limited, and their spin-off effects (or local multipliers) are rather small. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that the future condition of our cities depends on how well we manage the hundreds of older neighbourhoods and activity spaces that do not have the potential (or often the need) for specialized revitalization investments.

Future Research Needs

For present purposes it is sufficient to conclude that the structural parameters shaping urban Canada, and therefore the future quality of life in our cities, are even broader, more complex and less certain than Professor Hall's paper might suggest. The urban system is being reorganized, but not necessarily to the benefit of intermediate size cities and certainly not for the urban periphery. New and intensely-linked networks of urban centres are also emerging, at the international level and within growing regions. Decentralization at the local metropolitan scale is continuing, but on a geographical scale and with sufficient new employment nucleations to suggest the emergence of new and dispersed urban forms. Much of what is commonly labelled as decentralization, however, is the result of the underbounding of metropolitan areas in the census and our conceptual hesitation to accept the scale of contemporary metropolitan regions.

Of particular importance for policy research in understanding these trends is the need to improve our knowledge of the behaviour of individual components of the growth process, and especially the intersections of these components - in time and place. It tis hese dynamics that underlie the broad patterns of change identified above. These components include changes in life style, demographic structure, social-cultural diversity and economic re-organization, as well as the effects of new political and environmental movements. For

example, the country's aging population and the diverse flows of new immigrants will combine to set the social policy agenda for decades; they will also contribute to reorganizing urban labour markets, revising residential locational decisions and reordering choices of living arrangements. We know very little about how these new configurations of household structure - and thus of the consuming units - and new immigrant flows, will redesign our cities in the future.

At the same time, the rapid internationalization of national economies, and increasingly intense global competition (accelerated by new trade agreements and financial institutions), will favour certain types of skills, sectors of the economy and urban places over others. Which skills, sectors and places are favoured, of course, is extremely difficult to predict. We do know, however, that local social overhead capital, environmental conditions and quality of life considerations will play a larger and larger role in shaping urban growth. And, finally, political instability in Canada will continue to add further elements of uncertainty to the urban growth process itself and to our ability to understand and manage that process.

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